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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, : 
vs. : 
ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ : District Court No. 051903167 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellate Court No. 20070698 -CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a finding of guilty on Unlawful Possession of a 
Handgun, a third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503(3)(a); 
Carrying a Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor in violation 
of U.C.A. §76-10-504(1); and False Personal Information to Police Officer, a 
class C misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507. He was sentenced by 
the Honorable Roger S. Dutson to an indetemiinate term of not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison together with 365 daiys for the class A 
misdemeanor and 90 days for the class C misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
FOR A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT'S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHERE THE OFFICER 
SEIZED THE DEFENDANT WITH NO REASONABLE, 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL 
BEHAVIOR FOR WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL COULD BE 
ARRESTED? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court's legal conclusions 
should be reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. The trial court's findings of fact should be reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard of review. "[Qjuestions of law are reviewed for 
correctness, and the trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly 
erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This issue was 
preserved for appeal when the Defendant's attorney filed a written motion to 
suppress the evidence, which was denied by the trial court. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
FROM A CALIFORNIA COURT DOCKET USED BY THE 
PROSECUTOR AS PROOF OF A FELONY CONVICTION 
FOR THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON CHARGE? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This is a mixed question of fact and law. 
The trial court's legal conclusions should be reviewed for correctness, 
according no deference to the trial court's conclusions. The trial court's 
findings of fact should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of 
review. "[(Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's 
factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous." State v. Harmon, 910 
P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). This issue was preserved for appeal when the 
Defendant's attorney objected to the admission of the evidence both at the 
preliminary hearing as well as the trial, which objections were denied by the 
trial court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No 
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant 
is available as a witness: 
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered 
after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), 
adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not 
including, when offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for 
purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the 
accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect 
admissibility. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§41-6a-1805. Penalty for violation. 
(1) (a) A person who violates Section 41-6a-1803 is guilty of an infraction 
and shall be fined a maximum of $45. 
(b) The court shall waive all but $15 of the fine for a violation of Section 
41-6a-1803 if a person: 
(i) shows evidence of completion of a two-hour course approved by the 
commissioner of the Department of Public Safety that includes education on 
the benefits of using a safety belt and child restraint device; and 
(ii) if the violation is for an offense under Subsection 41-6a-1803(l)(b), 
submits proof of acquisition, rental, or purchase of a child restraint device. 
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(2) Points for a motor vehicle reportable violation, as defined under Section 
53-3-102, may not be assessed against a person for a violation of Section 41-
6a-1803. 
§58-37-8(l)(a)(iii) Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute; 
§76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer,, 
(1) A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of misleading a 
peace officer as to the person's identity, birth date, or place of residence, the 
person knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or address to a peace officer in 
the lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 
(2) A person commits a class A misdemeanor if, with the intent of leading a 
peace officer to believe that the person is another actual person, he gives the 
name, birth date, or address of another person to a peace officer acting in the 
lawful discharge of the peace officer's official duties. 
§76-10-503. Restrictions on possession, purchase, transfer, and ownership 
of dangerous weapons by certain persons. 
(3) A Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, 
uses, or has under his custody or control: 
(a) any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony; 
§76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon — Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 76-10-503 and in Subsections (2) and (3). 
(a) a person who carries a concealed dangerous weapon, as defined in 
Section 76-10-501, which is not a firearm on his person or one that is readily 
accessible for immediate use which is not securely encased, as defined in this 
part, in a place other than his residence, property, or business under his control 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor; and 
(b) a person without a valid concealed firearm permit who carries a 
concealed dangerous weapon which is a firearm and that contains no 
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ammunition is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, but if the firearm contains 
ammunition the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) A person who carries concealed a sawed-off shotgun or a sawed-off rifle 
is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) If the concealed firearm is used in the commission of a violent felony as 
defined in Section 76-3-203.5, and the person is a party to the offense, the 
person is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(4) Nothing in Subsection (1) shall prohibit a person engaged in the lawful 
taking of protected or unprotected wildlife as defined in Title 23, Wildlife 
Resources Code, from carrying a concealed weapon or a concealed firearm 
with a barrel length of four inches or greater as long as the taking of wildlife 
does not occur: 
(a) within the limits of a municipality in violation of that municipality's 
ordinances; or 
(b) upon the highways of the state as defined in Section 41-6a-102. 
§77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, 
without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any 
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device that 
enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the 
person arrested has committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person. 
§77-7-5. Issuance of warrant — Time and place arrests may be made — 
Contents of warrant — Responsibility for transporting prisoners — Court 
clerk to dispense restitution for transportation. 
(1) A magistrate may issue a warrant for arrest upon finding probable cause 
to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a public offense. If the 
offense charged is: 
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(a) a felony, the arrest upon a warrant may be made at any time of the day 
or night; or 
(b) a misdemeanor, the arrest upon a warrant can be made at night only if: 
(i) the magistrate has endorsed authorization to do so on the warrant; 
(ii) the person to be arrested is upon a public highway, in a public place, or 
in a place open to or accessible to the public; or 
(iii) the person to be arrested is encountered by a peace officer in the regular 
course of that peace officer's investigation of a criminal offense unrelated to 
the misdemeanor warrant for arrest. 
(2) For the purpose of Subsection (1): 
(a) daytime hours are the hours of 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.; and 
(b) nighttime hours are the hours after 10 p.m. and before 6 a.m. 
(3) (a) If the magistrate determines that the accused must appear in court, 
the magistrate shall include in the arrest warrant the name of the law 
enforcement agency in the county or municipality with jurisdiction over the 
offense charged. 
(b) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the magistrate under 
Subsection (3)(a) is responsible for providing inter-county transportation of the 
defendant, if necessary, from the arresting law enforcement agency to the court 
site. 
(ii) The law enforcement agency named on the warrant may contract with 
another law enforcement agency to have a defendant transported. 
(c) (i) The law enforcement agency identified by the magistrate under 
Subsection (a) as responsible for transporting the defendant shall provide to the 
court clerk of the court in which the defendant is tried, an affidavit stating that 
the defendant was transported, indicating the law enforcement agency 
responsible for the transportation, and stating the number of miles the 
defendant was transported. 
(ii) The court clerk shall account for restitution paid under Subsection 76-3-
201(5) for governmental transportation expenses and dispense restitution 
monies collected by the court to the law enforcement agency responsible for 
the transportation of a convicted defendant. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003)- Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged with Unlawful Possession of a Handgun, a 
third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. §76-10-503(3)(a); Carrying a 
Concealed Dangerous Weapon, a class A misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. 
§76-10-504(1); and False Personal Information to Police Officer, a class C 
misdemeanor in violation of U.C.A. §76-8-507. A preliminary hearing was 
held on April 17, 2006. On May 17, 2006, the Defendant filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence obtained during a search incident to an arrest for a no 
seatbelt violation. Oral arguments on the motion were held on May 22, 2006. 
The trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence. The 
Defendant then had a jury trial on December 20 and 21, 2006, at which trial 
the Defendant was found guilty. The Defendant was sentenced on August 6, 
2007, to serve an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years at the Utah 
State Prison together with 365 days and 90 days. The Sentence, Judgment and 
Commitment was signed on August 9, 2007. A notice of appeal was filed on 
August 21, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A preliminary hearing on this case was held on April 17, 2006, at which 
time the only witness was Officer Ken Hammond who testified that on 
February 14, 2005, he pulled over a vehicle in which the Defendant was a 
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passenger for a license plate light violation. At that time he began talking to the 
driver, and was interrupted by the Defendant (R.239/8). Eventually he obtained 
the name of the driver and then requested the passenger's information on the 
grounds that he had violated the no seat belt ordinance (R.239/8). The officer 
intended to issue the Defendant a citation for not wearing a seatbelt, but since 
he had no identification the officer determined that he was going to arrest him 
for that violation. (R.239/10). Officer Hammond, and a later arriving backup 
officer, had the Defendant step out of the vehicle and placed him under arrest. 
(R.239/12) They then conducted a search incident to arrest and discovered 
some identification as well as a black handgun sitting in the vehicle between 
the door and the passenger seat. (R.239/13) Officer Hammond admitted on 
cross examination that the only reason that he was arrested was a seatbelt 
violation. (R.239/18-19) He also acknowledged that he would not have 
searched the vehicle but for the arrest for the seatbelt violation. (R.239/19) 
Shortly thereafter the Defendant filed a motion to suppress on Fourth 
Amendment constitutional grounds, and parties utilized the testimony obtained 
at the preliminary hearing rather than holding an additional evidentiary hearing 
on the motion. After the motion and memorandum were filed, the State, in 
their responsive memorandum, claimed that Detective Hammond could have 
charged the Defendant also with an interfering with an arresting officer charge 
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(although no formal charges of interfering were ever filed, either at the time of 
the arrest nor at any subsequent date). The trial court, after taking the matter 
under advisement, denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. 
The Defendant further objected to the prosecution's use of a non-
certified conviction out of the state of California to establish the element that 
the Defendant was a restricted person. Subsequent to the preliminary hearing, 
the State filed a motion to allow the introduction of evidence of a copy of the 
court docket or minute entry out of California that was certified by the court 
clerk. Over the Defendant's objections, the State was allowed to introduce that 
minute entry or court docket as the sole evidence that the Defendant had 
previously been convicted of a felony, thus making him a restricted person. 
(R.239/33-42) 
During the course of the trial the following evidence was presented to a 
jury: 
The Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was pulled over 
for a faulty license plate light. As the officer approached the vehicle he noticed 
that the Defendant was not wearing a seatbelt. (R.239/102) During a 
conversation with the driver of the vehicle, the Defendant began asking 
questions as to why the officer stopped the vehicle. The officer refused to 
answer the question, and the Defendant then became argumentative and cursed 
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at the officer asking him why he stopped the vehicle. (R.239/102) The officer 
then asked the Defendant for his identification, to which the Defendant 
responded that he had no identification. (R.239/103) The officer then asked the 
Defendant for his name and date of birth and was given the name of Jesus 
Hernandez with an incomplete birthday of 3/18/19 and also gave him a Social 
Security number. (R.239/104) The officer asked the Defendant if he had a 
Utah driver's license, and the Defendant then told the officer that he had an ID 
out of California. (R.239/104) The officer then made a decision to arrest the 
Defendant for not wearing a seat belt. Pursuant to a search incident to arrest 
the officer found a wallet on the Defendant's person that contained a California 
identification card. (R.239/112) The officer then ran the information on the 
California ID and discovered that the Defendant's date of birth was 4/18/1975 
and that the Social Security number that he was given was different than that 
given to him by the Defendant. (R.239/113) During the search of the vehicle 
incident to arrest the officer found an unloaded black handgun in the gap 
between the seat and the door next to where the Defendant had been sitting. 
The gun did have bullets in the magazine, although they were not in the 
chamber. (R.239/115) The officer testified that the Defendant did not have a 
concealed weapon permit; and, over the Defendant's previous objection, 
admitted a certified copy of the court docket of the Defendant's conviction for 
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felony manufacturing methamphetamine. (R.239/128) The driver testified that 
the gun was not hers, and she had never seen it before. (R.239/152). The 
defendant was convicted of possession of a weapon by a restricted person, 
carrying a concealed weapon in an automobile, and false information police. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure was violated during his encounter with Officer Hammond. 
The violation occurred when Officer Hammond decided to arrest the Defendant 
for a seatbelt violation even though state law specifically prohibits the arrest of 
an individual for a seat belt violation. Since all of the evidence obtained in this 
case flowed directly from that illegal arrest, all of that information should be 
suppressed as a violation of the Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The second error made by the trial court was the admitting into evidence 
a document that is, in essence, a minute entry, for purposes of proving that the 
Defendant had a previous felony conviction. This conviction would be 
necessary to establish that the Defendant was a restricted person in possession 
of a firearm. The trial court should have required that a certified copy of a 
judgment, conviction and commitment document be entered into evidence for 
purposes of establishing the previous felony conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
FOR A VIOLATION OF THE DEFENDANT9S FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WHERE THE OFFICER SEIZED 
THE DEFENDANT WITH NO REASONABLE, 
ARTICULABLE SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 
FOR WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL COULD BE ARRESTED. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well 
as Article 1 Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides in 
relevant part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated." 
The Courts on both the state and federal levels have defined when a 
seizure is unreasonable. The Supreme Court in the case of Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) held: 
... the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 
21A U. S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to preserve as private, 
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected. 
The general rule regarding warrantless searches was established in the 
case of Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) in which the Supreme Court set forth a 
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three-prong test in determining whether an individual is seized and what type 
of search is permitted under various types of seizures. 
In State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650, 661 (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme 
Court defined once again its' long-standing position on permissible levels of 
seizures. In Hansen, the Court defined these levels as follows: 
A level-one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is a 
consensual encounter wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to 
non-coercive questioning by an officer. Id. Since the encounter is 
consensual, and the person is free to leave at any point, there is no 
seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Royer, 460 
U.S. at 498-99. 
A level-two encounter involves an investigative detention that is 
usually characterized as brief and non-intrusive. United States v. 
Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Werking, 
915 F.2d at 1407 (noting a level two encounter is an investigative 
detention or "Teny stop"). Although it is a Fourth Amendment 
seizure, probable cause is not required. Evans, 937 F.2d at 1537. 
Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences . . . give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is 
committing a crime," an officer may initiate an investigative 
detention without consent. Werking, 915 F.2d at 1407. 
A level-three encounter involves an arrest, which has been 
"characterized [as a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] 
requires probable cause." Id. A level three encounter is also a 
Fourth Amendment seizure. Id. 
The above-discussed constitutional provisions prohibit unreasonable 
searches and seizures. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992). Under 
these provisions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless 
undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Id at 
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855. One recognized exception is a search incident to lawful arrest. Michigan 
v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); see also 
State v. Lopes, 552 P.2d 120, 121-122 (Utah 1976). For a search incident to 
arrest to be constitutional, the underlying arrest must be lawful but it need not 
be supported by an arrest warrant. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 57 P.3d at 1059, 
citing Kerv. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41, 83 S.Ct. 1623 (1963). However, if an 
arrest violated a defendant's constitutional rights under either the Fourth 
Amendment or the Utah Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any 
evidence secured incident to arrest must typically be excluded from a criminal 
trial pursuant to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1059 citing Whiteley v. Warden, 
Wyoming State Penitentiary,AQ\ U.S. 560, 568-69, 941 S.CT. 1031 (1971). 
Under the Fourth Amendment, an officer must have probable cause 
before the officer can effect a warrantless arrest. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, 
57 P.3d at 1059. The United States Constitution permits an officer to arrest a 
suspect without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect 
has committed or is committing an offense. Id. The determination of whether 
the police had probable cause to arrest a suspect is a showing of the facts and 
circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a 
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing in the circumstances 
15 
shown that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an 
offense. Id. citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 (1979). 
In the case at bar, the trial court was presented with a situation wherein 
the only evidence supplied by the arresting officer was that the Defendant was 
being arrested for a seatbelt violation. It was only after the arrest and 
subsequent search did the officer find information which would support the 
filing of three charges for which the Defendant was convicted. Utah Code 
Annotated §41-6a-1805 provides that any violation of the seatbelt law is an 
infraction with a maximum penalty of a $45 fine. 
Although, according to U.C.A. §77-7-2 a police officer may arrest an 
individual for any public offense committed in his presence, there is a question 
whether or not a seatbelt violation, which is an infraction, constitutes a public 
offense which wouldn't authorize an arrest. It is interesting to note that UCA 
§77-7-5 allows a magistrate to issue an arrest warrant only for felonies for a 
misdemeanor charges. A magistrate is not authorized to issue an arrest warrant 
for infraction charge. It seems incongruous that a police officer without 
judicial oversight can effectuate an arrest for an infraction for which a 
magistrate has no authority to issue a warrant. Unfortunately there is no 
definition in the code regarding public offense. 
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This Court, in the case of State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App. 332 at J^ 10, 
37 P.3d 260, reversed a defendant's conviction in a case that is somewhat 
similar to the case at bar. In Valenzuela, the defendant was stopped in a public 
bank based upon a tip from an unknown informant that the defendant had 
committed a forgery. The defendant was arrested and a search revealed a 
controlled substance. The Court determined that a reasonable officer under the 
circumstances could not have had probable cause to believe that the defendant 
had committed an offense, therefore the seizure was unconstitutional. 
Under the circumstances, the officer had no authority to arrest the 
Defendant for an infraction for which there is no possibility of jail. The fact 
that the officer thereafter seized the Defendant, violated the Defendant's Fourth 
Amendment constitutional rights. Pursuant to state and federal case law, 
anything obtained would be in violation of the Defendant's constitutional rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure. Once that line was crossed, no 
quantum of evidence can thereafter retroactively cure this violation. 
This Court, in the case of State v. Martinez, 2006 UT App. 76, 131 P.3d 
879, addressed the issue as to whether an officer has a right to arrest an 
individual for a mere traffic offense. This Court determined that based upon 
the language of Utah Statutes an officer had the authority to arrest an 
individual for a traffic offense. The Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of 
17 
various states and their positions regarding arrest on traffic offenses. While that 
case at first blush may appear to be controlling, the significant difference in the 
present case is that the offense does not fall within the parameters allowing 
arrest under former §41-6-166. Those cases involved a misdemeanor to which 
an officer has the discretion to either issue a citation or proceed to arrest. In 
the present case the only violation for which the officer acknowledged 
arresting the defendant was an infraction, one not subject to arrest. 
Infraction offenses are treated differently from misdemeanor offenses 
due to the difference in possible jail sentences. For instance, an individual 
charged with an infraction is not entitled to a jury trial. (See Rule 17(d) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) Furthermore, an individual charged with an 
infraction is not entitled to the appointment of a public defender. Again this 
distinction hinges solely on the possibility of a jail sentence. (See Argersinger 
v. Hamlin 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012 (U.S.1972) where the Court held: 
"that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned 
for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he 
was represented by counsel at his trial.") 
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 391 (1914) ruled that the exclusionary rule would apply 
to all federal prosecutions. In that case the Court held: 
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The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the 
United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their 
power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the 
exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the 
people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all 
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This 
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, 
and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon 
all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of 
the laws. 
This fundamental protection was extended to the States in the case of 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The exclusionary prohibition extends as 
well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions. {Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)) 
Since the officer in the present case did not have probable cause that the 
Defendant committed a public offense subject to a jail sentence, he lacked 
authority to arrest the Defendant. Once the officer crossed that impermissible 
line, any evidence that was discovered should have been suppressed as fruit of 
the poisonous tree. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE 
FROM A CALIFORNIA COURT DOCKET USED BY 
THE PROSECUTOR AS PROOF OF A FELONY 
CONVICTION FOR THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 
BY A RESTRICTED PERSON CHARGE. 
One of tl ie offenses with w hich the Defendai it was cl larged was that of 
possession of a dangerous weapon • •.' ^ ^ •••is"- (> 'ei tl 1 2 
Defendant's objection at the preliminary hearing, as well as at the trial, the 
State entered ii ito eviden ce a cc >nv of a conn docket that indicated that the 
Defendant had at one point pled guilty to a iciony offense in a different state. 
The Defendant objected to " ; .. ,\-JC^OM : u..u jocket entry due to the fact 
that it did not contaii 1 a judge's signature and w a s 1 lot a judgment sentei ice or 
commitment order. The State produced no other e\idencv 'voarci:^. -:w • •••/•• r-
conviction of the Defendant, which was one of the elements of the above listed 
offense. 
There are numerous reasons why this type of evidence was deficient in 
esiablisbMu. '.;.</ w^ru'ied ,^.>.>i: cieme;:.. ,*si. as mentioned above, the 
dnniiTirn- ' V ^ I K W .\-^ pv.M-.-i-, . ,K;:kr •;••:•- r^.a'.^ -A: n v --u-:u;.;;v ny 
the judge, and although certified, it would consist merely of the ronti chirks' 
notes. Furthermore, there is simply no guarantee that the docket entry recorded 
accurately the ultimate judgment and sentence by the court. The very reason 
that State of I Itah requires a judgment, sentence and. commitment signed by a 
j;.k.iL-v" 1 ; •.•". -;;v ^Ci-iVu'-- '•-. ic^\^\w . •. „;:_ ^aie o'. - kir. snowing a 
crimiiic!: ^feihla-i * .^ 1 • i i !!- ivwM-= ; i 'c. ^n^;e vb!*! . . ^ n ^ * 
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certified docket entry simply does not carry the degree of reliability anticipated 
by due process. 
In the case of State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 702(Utah 1985) the Court was 
presented with a case very similar to the case at bar wherein the evidence 
established the following: 
At trial, the State presented evidence of defendant's prior 
conviction of robbery in the state of Washington. The evidence 
consisted of papers that included a cover letter from an agent of 
the Washington Department of Corrections, an attestation 
affidavit by the records custodian, a photograph of defendant, a 
copy of a fingerprint card, a copy of a warrant of commitment, 
and a copy of a judgment and sentence. Defense counsel objected 
to the admission of the documents on the ground that they were 
not properly authenticated and were therefore hearsay. The trial 
court ruled that the evidence was admissible. 
In that case the Court ruled pursuant to former Rule 68(1) the Utah Rules of 
Evidence which stated in relevant part: 
An official record or entry therein, when admissible for any 
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or 
by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the 
record, or by his deputy, and in the absence of judicial 
knowledge or competent evidence, accompanied with a 
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in 
which the record is kept is within the United States ..., the 
certificate may be made by a judge of a court of record of the 
district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, 
authenticated by the seal of his office. 
The current rule of evidence governing the admissibility of a judgment of 
previous convictions is contained in Rule 803(22) with states: 
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Judgment of Previous Conviction. hvidencc o; a ;.na, 
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilt} (but not 
upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilt} of a 
crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year, to prove any fact essentia! to sustain iIK-judgment but not 
including, when offered b\ the prosecution in a criminal 
prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments 
against persons other ihan the accused. The pendenc} of an 
appeal may be shown but docs not affect admissibilitx. 
I ;;xkT b .i:- i- . .-: :-, :-.iv;»v.i .NVIC^JK-. u 'npeui:* J\:M an acia..
 :uugmeni of 
conviction is reqi li red for purposes of pro\ i 1 ig at 1 element of a criminal offense. 
Under former Rule 68(1 ), lire Utah Supreme Court required as follows: 
It appears, therefore, that a judicial certification is not ah\a \s 
required. In this case, however, there was n b*judicia< 
knowledge" on the part, of the trial court, as the record came 
from another state. Further, the copy of the warrant of 
commitment and the judgment included in Exhibit No. ". do 
not contain the signature of the judge who made the Washington 
order. Because of these defects, it appears that Exhibit No. 11 
WPQ not properly authenticated and therefore not proper!) 
Liuaiitied. Defendant was not prejudiced, however. b> the 
admission of the exhibit because defendant himself admitted 10 
his prior felon} conviction and incarceration on cross-
examination.1'" Thus, the admission of the documents from the 
state of Washington e\ idencing defendant's prior conviction 
was harmless error. (Buei @ 703-704) 
inj ,';*:;; iu Kines o: Lviuence requires "evidence 01 a tinal judgment 
neither of ilicsc hn\^ !\-i^-, ^n»di;t,-:! : [ *. • -•
 { --• w-v\ iv---'"-JV , ; V : - L C 
was deficient in establishing one of the elements of the offense. 
In the case of State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980), the Court 
held that evidence that the defendant was on parole in another state did not 
allow an inference that the defendant had been convicted of a felony. That case 
also involved a situation where the state attempted to prove the defendant was 
a felon and therefore in violation of the possession of a weapon by a restricted 
person statute. The Court reversed that conviction due solely to the 
deficiencies in proof of the element of a prior conviction of a felony. 
In the case of State v. Higginbotham, 917 P2d. 545 (Utah 1996), the 
Court ruled that evidence of a Idaho bench warrant demanding a defendant be 
brought before the court to show cause why her probation should not be 
revoked did not establish that the defendant was on probation for a felony and 
was thus therefore insufficient to support a conviction that the defendant was in 
possession of a weapon by a restricted person. 
Other jurisdictions have similarly held that evidence of a final judgment 
is necessary in establishing an element of an offense in criminal cases. In State 
v. Bernard, 366 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (La. 1978), the Court held that certification 
of prior conviction documents by a record clerk could not constitute evidence 
and could not be used to identify the defendant is a person with the prior 
convictions. See, however, Griffin v. State, 415 N.E. 2d 60 (Ind. 1981) where 
the Court ruled that the trial court had properly admitted criminal docket sheets 
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si lowing tl :iat defendai it 1 lad | )led gi liltv t o a prior cl large, thus establishing the 
prior felony element of the habitual criminal charge. That case, however, 
involved a state statute that specifically allowed such evidence. Additionally, 
the defendant in Griffin, unlike the defendant in the current case, testified and 
was cross-examined on \\i* prior ieiony com a iu>ns. 
CONCLl ISION 
Officer Hammond violated the Defendant's Fourth Vncpd-'.vpi '•:<•:-•!* 
throughout this encounter. He arrested and searched the Defendant for an 
infraction, for which "the defendant could not have been sentenced to one 
minute 01 jaii. I he uliieer, therefore, jailed ihe IXr-endam ior a charge which 
the trial judge would ha ve been pi ohibited by law ft om imposing ;L4,J. /n;s 
action coi i stiti ited a ' iolatioi i of the Defendant's Fourtl 1 vriepJp^rPi 
constitutional rights. Furthermore, the State utilized impermissible Q\ i/k-ner H 
establishing the restricted person element of the offense of the possession of a 
weapon by restricted person in charge. Absent this evidence, the jury could not 
have convieWu live iX:icpu,int oi uvai uiknsi. 1 or ihese reasons the Defendant 
respectfully requests this Coi n t to rev erse tl ic i:i ial c oui t ' s dei rial of 1 lis motion 
to s i lppre s s tli e e\ i d en c e 
,TH DATED this 7 j n day of February 2008 
iNDALL W. MCHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0180, postage 
prepaid this 7 day of February 2008. 
LNDALL W. RI($HARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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ADDENDUM A 
2001 AU3-q P 3= 5U 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - x f e d M toll> U U u ! L O v M 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
AUG 0 9 2007 MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051903167 FS 
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON 
Date: August 6, 2 007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: carier 
Prosecutor: MILES, BRANDEN B 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MARTIN GRAVIS, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 18, 1975 
Video 
Tape Number: RSD08 0 6 07 Tape Count: 22 7 
CHARGES 
1. UNLAW PERS POSS/PURCH/TRANS HANDGUN - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/21/2006 Guilty 
2. CARRYING A CONCEALED DANGEROUS WEAPON - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/21/2006 Guilty 
3. FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION TO PO - Class C Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/21/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is time set for APP Sentencing. The defendant is present in 
custody from the Weber County Jail with counsel. A presentence 
investigation report has been submitted to the Court. No objections 
have been made. Court proceeds with sentencing. 
*\r-,« /-»**« .^ ^ „ 
19763047 pages: Page 1 OOi 
Case No: 051903167 
Date: Aug 06, 2 0 07 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on rhe defendant's conviction of UNLAW PERS POSS/PUR'JK/TRANS 
HANDGUN a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced tc an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years m the Utah State 
Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff : The defendant: is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Each term imposed shall run concurrent with one another and also 
shall run concurrent with the sentence imposed m cases 061901109 
and 061904426. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends the defendant be allowed to paiticipal- a l 
substance abuse program at the Promentory Facility. 
SENTUNCK iKJL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CARRYING A CONCEALED 
DANGEROUS WEAPON a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced 
to a term of 365 day(s) 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FALSE PERSONAL INFORMATION 
TO PO a Class C Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 9 0 day(s) 
Page 2 
Case No: 051903167 
Date: Aug 06, 2007 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The jail time imposed may be served at the Utah State Prison, 
Dated this day of gk/L.™£>. 
ROGER S DUTSON 
District/ Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
ADDENDUM B 
i^^> 
WEBER COUNTY 
*,
 t i i»f*^ S I > £** 
# < v &£» 
2380 Wdshington Boulevard 
Suite 230 
Ogden Utah 84401-1464 
Telephone: (801)399-8377 
24 Hour FAX (801)399-8304 
**y 
RECEIVED 
JUN 2 3 2005 
EAST DISTRICT* 
DATE: June 23, 2005 
TO: LOS ANGELES COURT, ATTN. CERTIFICATION CLERIC 
FROM: WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY1 S OFFICE, OGDEN UTAH 
OUR OFFICE IS rN NEED OF A CERTIFIED COPY OF PREVIOUS 
CONVICTION(S) ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL IN ORDER TO FTLE AN 
ENHANCED INFORMATION. THE COURT REQUIRES A CERTIFIED COPY OF 
THE CONVICTION/SENTENCE if available.. 
NAME: 
HERNANDEZ, ANGEL JESUS 
Mark R DeCana 
w°ber county Attorney 
T 
Chief Deputy 
William P Dames 
Chief Criminal Deputy 
Gary I? Hew^id. 
T 
Chief Clvfj Depu ty 
Pflvld C Wilson 
T 
Attorneys 
RlttwidA Pamiley 
L Dccin Sdundcrs 
Monette Hurtado 
Unmi Corp 
Ddvicl E Wyiskopf 
Chnstapner f Alfred 
BienclciJ Region 
Girniilo L Ncider 
Tncia i>mec|iey 
pranctenfl Miles 
Ndthcin D Lyon 
T 
Administration 
Kimbcrlcy A. LCQ 
• 
Investigations 
Robert D Carpenter 
Shane I Minor 
T 
Victim Assistance 
Sharl vanderl leidc 
LeeAnn Nidlson 
Amanda Da hi 
DOB: 
04/18/1975 
(1) CASE NO.: 
(2) OFFENSE: 
KA 038275-01 
POSSESS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
PLEASE PROVIDE A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT AND 
CONVICTION, SIGNED AND BY A JUDGE AND COURT CLERK (UNDER 
SEAL), BY MAIL , TO THIS OFFICE, ATTENTION ANGIE. IF YOU HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS PLEASE CALL ME AT 801-399-8674 
Thank you, 
**SECOND REQUEST: RECEIVED INFORMATION ON THE CO-
DEFENDANT TYSON JEREMY DANCE! S. PLEASE SEND INFORMATION 
ON ANGEL HERNANDEZ** 
0*9 
Pi inted on fccyded payei 
IN FHE SUPERIOR COURT OF EAST DISTRICT! JUDICIAL 0" •'"•&:: ^ 7, 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
D. KA038275 PAGE NO.. ,.. 
HE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNI A, \ 'S . CURRENT DATE 06/23/05 
EFENDANT 01: ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ 
\W ENFORCEMENT AGENCY EFFECTING. ARREST: LASD - WALNUT/SAN DIMAS STATIN 
ML: APPEARANCE AMOUNT DATE RECEIPT OR SURETY COMPANY REGISTER 
DATE OF BAIL POSTED BOND NO. NUMBER 
\SE FILED ON 11/21/97. 
sIFORMATION FILED ON 12/05/97. 
-FENSE(S): 
COUNT 01: 11379.6(A) H&S FEL - MANUFACTURE CONTROLED SUBSINCE. 
COUNT 02: 11377(A) H&S FEL - POSSESS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
JMMITTED ON OR ABOUT 11/04/97 IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGEL ES 
EXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
12/05/97 830 AM ARRAIGNMENT DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
M 12/02/97 AT 600 PM : 
PRELIM TRANSCRIPT FILED S3 
M 12/05/97 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
CASE CALLED FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
ARTIES: DANIEL LOPEZ (JUDGE) SHIRLEY JETT (CLERK) 
JOYCE MALLETT (REP) MARGARET '. ,M) 
JBLIC DEFENDER APPOINTED. JEFFREY ZIMEL - P.D. 
EFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED B\ iEFFKL". ZIMEL DEPUTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
INFORMATION FILED AND THE DEFENDANT IS ARRAIGNED. 
EFENDANT WAIVES FURTHER ARRAIGNMENT. 
EFENDANT .PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO COUNT 01, 11379.6(A) H&S MANUFACTURE CONTROLED 
SUBSTNCE. 
EFENDANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO COUNT 02, 11377(A) H&S - POSSESS CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. 
COURT ORDERS AND FINDINGS: 
-THE COURT, WITH THE CONSEN1 01 : 1 1 IE DEFENDANT AND ALL COUNSEL, 
REFERS THE MATTER TO THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT FOR A PRE-PLEA 
REPORT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 131,3. 
-THE COURT ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR ON THE NEXT COURT DATE. 
DEFENDANT DENIES ALLEGATIONS. 
EXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
UPON MOTION OF COURT 
1/06/98 830 AM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE DIST EAST DISTRICT DEP T EAE 
EXT SCHEDULED EVENT 2: 
UPON MOTION OF COURT 
02/02/98 830 AM JURY TRIAL DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
USTODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
N 01/06/98 A ] 830 Af 1 II J EAS I DIS FRIC F DEP I E, \E 
CASE CALLED FOR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
ARTIES: DANIEL LOPEZ (JUDGE) SHIRLEY JETT (CLERK) 
JOYCE MALLETT (REP) MARGARET MOE (DA) 
SE NO. KA038275 
F NO. 0 1 
PAGE NO. 2 
DATE PRINTED 0 6 / 2 3 / 0 5 
FENDANT I S PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY JEFFREY ZIMEL DEPUTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
FENDANT ADVISED OF AND PERSONALLY AND EXPLICITLY WAIVES THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: 
WRITTEN ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS AND WAIVERS FILED, INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 
REIN 
IAL BY COURT AND TRIAL BY JURY 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES; 
SUBPOENA OF WITNESSES INTO COURT TO TESTIFY IN YOUR DEFENSE; 
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; 
FENDANT ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING: 
•HE NATURE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, THE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE IN THE 
IFORMATION AND POSSIBLE DEFENSES TO SUCH CHARGES; 
"HE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE, INCLUDING 
THE MAXIMUM PENALTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AND THE POSSIBLE LEGAL 
EFFECTS AND MAXIMUM PENALTIES INCIDENT TO SUBSEQUENT CONVICTIONS FOR THE 
SAME OR SIMILAR OFFENSES; 
THE EFFECTS OF PROBATION; 
CF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN, YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT A CONVICTION OF THE 
OFFENSE FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN CHARGED WILL HAVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
DEPORTATION, EXCLUSION FROM ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, OR DENIAL OF 
NATURALIZATION PURSUANT TO THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES; 
HE COURT FINDS THAT EACH SUCH WAIVER IS KNOWINGLY, UNDERSTANDINGLY, AND 
EXPLICITLY MADE; COUNSEL JOINS IN THE WAIVERS 
PON MOTION OF DEFENDANT, PLEA TO COUNT 01 VACATED AND SET ASIDE, AND NEW AND 
DIFFERENT PLEA OF GUILTY ENTERED. 
OUNT (01) : DISPOSITION: CONVICTED 
OURT FINDS THAT THERE IS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR DEFENDANT'S PLEA, AND COURT 
ACCEPTS PLEA. 
TRIAL DATE OF 2-2-98 ADVANCED AND VACATED. 
COURT CONSIDERS THE PRE-PLEA REPORT. 
AIVES TIME FOR SENTENCE. 
EXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
SENTENCING 
S TO COUNT (01): 
SERVE 5 YEARS IN ANY STATE PRISON 
COURT SELECTS THE MID TERM OF 5 YEARS AS TO COUNT 01. 
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE SUSPENDED 
)EFENDANT PLACED ON FORMAL PROBATION 
FOR A PERIOD OF 003 YEARS UNDER THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
SERVE 365 DAYS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL 
DEFENDANT GIVEN TOTAL CREDIT FOR 96 DAYS IN CUSTODY 64 DAYS ACTUAL CUSTODY 
AND 32 DAYS GOOD TIME/WORK TIME 
IN ADDITION: 
-THE DEFENDANT IS TO PAY A RESTITUTION FINE PURSUANT TO SECTION 
1202.4(B) PENAL CODE IN THE AMOUNT OF $200.00 
-INCREMENT (11372.5 H&S, LAB ANALYSIS) $ 50.00 
-NOT USE OR POSSESS ANY NARCOTICS, DANGEROUS OR RESTRICTED DRUGS 
OR ASSOCIATED PARAPHERNALIA, EXCEPT WITH VALID PRESCRIPTION, AND 
STAY AWAY FROM PLACES WHERE USERS, BUYERS OR SELLERS CONGREGATE, 
EXCEPT IN AN AUTHORIZED DRUG COUNSELING PROGRAM. 
-NOT ASSOCIATE WITH PERSONS KNOWN BY YOU TO BE NARCOTIC OR DRUG 
USERS OR SELLERS. 
-SUBMIT TO PERIODIC ANTI-NARCOTIC TESTS AS DIRECTED BY THE 
PROBATION OFFICER. 
E NO. KA038275 
NO. 01 
PAGE NO. 3 
DATE PRINTED 06/2 3/05 
NOT ASSOCIATE WITH CO-DEFENDANT(S) TYSON 3 DANGLEIS 
COOPERATE WITH THE PROBATION OFFICER IN A PLAN FOR DRUG 
COUNSELING AND REHABILATATION 
SUPPORT DEPENDENTS AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. 
•SEEK AND MAINTAIN TRAINING, SCHOOLING OR EMPLOYMENT AS APPROVED 
BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. 
•MAINTAIN RESIDENCE AS APPROVED BY THE PROBA1 ION OFFICER. 
•NOT OWN, USE OR POSSESS ANY DANGEROUS OR DEADLY WEAPONS, 
INCLUDING ANY FIREARMS, KNIVES OR OTHER CONCEALABLE WEAPONS. 
-SUBMIT PERSON AND PROPERTY TO SEARCH OR SEIZURE AT ANY TIME OF 
THE DAY OR NIGHT BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR BY PROBATION 
OFFICER WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
-OBEY ALL LAWS AND ORDERS OF THE COURT. 
-OBEY ALL RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT. 
-USE ONLY TRUE NAME WITH GOVERNMENT AND POLICE. OFFICIALS, WHICH 
IS ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ 
ZOURT ORDERS AND FINDINGS; 
-DEFENDANT TO REPORT TO THE PROBATION Of-MCLR WIUIIN 4H HOURS 
AFTER RELEASE FROM CUSTODY. 
-PAY THE COSTS OF PROBATION SERVICES (PURSUANT TO 1203.IB PC) TO 
THE PROBATION OFFICER IN THE AMOUNT THE PROBATION OFFICER SHALL 
PRESCRIBE, 
-DEFENDANT ORDERED TO REPORT TO FINANCIAL EVALUATOR WIT! fIN 5 
DAYS OF RELEASE FROM CUSTODY 
-REGISTER AS NARCOTIC OFFENDER WITH LOCAL POLICE. DEPARTMENT OR 
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
-DEFENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES TO THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS ALL THE PROBATION CONDITIONS, AND 
DEFENDANT AGREES TO ABIDE BY SAME. 
UNT (01): DISPOSITION: CONVICTED 
MAINING COUNTS DISMISSED: 
COUNT (02) : DISMISSED DUE TO PLEA NEGOTIATION 
STRACT ISSUED ON 01/06/98 FOR COUNT 01 
IV JUDGMENT CODE 3G 
XT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
PROBATION IN EFFECT/REMANDED 
ISTODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
I 12/10/98 AT 830 AM : 
PURSUANT TO REQUEST FROM PROBATION DEPARTMENT, MATTER IS SET ON 
CALENDAR FOR 01.0499 AT 8: 30AM IN DEPARTMENT FAE. „ HEARING ON 
VIOLATION. 
IXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
01/04/99 830 AM POSSIBLE VIOL. OF PROBATION DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
J^ UJ/04/yy '.I ..JU AM IN EAS I DIS I RIC1 DEP1 E \E 
CASE CALLED FOR POSSIBLE VIOL. OF PROBATION 
^RTIES: THEODORE D. PIATT (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) CONSTANCE E. BUGH (DA) 
EFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
PROBATION REVOKED 
S TO COUNT (01): 
^SE NO. KA038275 
EF NO. 01 
PAGE NO. 4 
DATE PRINTED 06/23/05 
DEFENDANT NOT IN COURT. PROBATION REVOKED. BENCH WARRANT IS 
ISSUED. NO BAIL. LATER: DEFENDANT APPEARS IN COURT. DEFEN-
DANT REMANDED. NO BAIL. BENCH WARRANT PREVIOUSLY ISSUED IS 
QUASHED AND RECALLED. 
MATTER SET FOR VIOLATION HEARING. PEOPLE WILL SUBPENA PROBATION 
OFFICER INTO COURT FOR 1-21-99. 
AIL SET AT NO BAIL. 
MV ABSTRACT NOT REQUIRED 
EXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
01/21/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
USTODY STATUS: REMANDED TO CUSTODY 
N 01/21/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
CASE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
'ARTIES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) CONSTANCE E. BUGH (DA) 
>EFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
MATTER RESET FOR VIOLATION HEARING TO 2-18-99. 
PEOPLE TO RESUBPENA PROBATION OFFICER INTO COURT FOR 2-18-99. 
JEXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
02/18/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
ZUSTODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
)N 02/18/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
CASE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
^ARTIES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) ABRAM WEISBROT (DDA) 
r*HE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT(IN LOCK UP) AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY 
PUBLIC DEFENDER 
D. LINK STANDS IN FOR M. COGHLAN. MATTER CONTINUED AS INDICATED 
PEOPLE TO HAVE WITNESSES HERE ON 3-4-99. 
NEXT SCHEDULED EVENT: 
UPON MOTION OF COURT 
03/04/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
CUSTODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
ON 03/04/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
CASE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
PARTIES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) RICHARD CEBALLOS (DA) 
DEFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
COURT FINDS DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF PROBATION. 
PROBATION REVOKED 
PROBATION REINSTATED. 
BE NO, KA038275 
- NO. 01 
PAGE NO. 5 
DATE PRINTED 06/2 3/05 
PROBATION IS CONTINUED ON SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
TO COUNT (01): 
PROBATION OFFICER DARILYN FARRIS AND DEFENDANl ARE SWORN AND ARE 
rESTIFY. DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO SERVE 365 DAYS IN COUN1 Y DAI I 
DEFENDANT RECEIVES 0 CREDITS. 
ZOURT ORDERS NO EARLY RELEASE FROM CO! IN F Y 3 « > II 
i/ ABSTRACT NOT REQUIRED 
<T SCHEDULED EVENT: 
PROBATION IN EFFECT/REMANDED 
STODY STATUS: ON PROBATION. 
